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Special Report

# CASTRO AND THE NARCOTICS CONNECTION

1983




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ACY-4345



# CASTRO AND THE NARCOTICS CONNECTION

The Cuban government's use of narcotics trafficking to finance and promote terrorism.

"I am not one who often feels or too often vents anger, but I want the American people to know that they're faced with the most sinister and despicable actions. We have strong evidence that high-level Cuban government officials have been involved in smuggling drugs into the United States."

President Ronald Reagan, May 6, 1983

*"..there is strong evidence that Castro officials are involved in the drug trade, peddling drugs like criminals, profiting on the misery of the addicted. I would like to take this opportunity to call on the Castro regime for an accounting. Is this drug peddling simply the act of renegade officials, or is it officially sanctioned? The world deserves an answer."*

**President Ronald Reagan**  
May 20, 1983



## PREFACE


This Special Report is the first comprehensive documentation of Fidel Castro's extensive use of narcotics as a weapon against the United States and a means to finance and promote terrorism. Through careful investigation of the Jaime Guillot-Lara case, five congressional hearings; and recently de-classified reports by the Departments of State and Justice, the proof is undeniable: the Castro government is financing terrorism by crippling America's children through narcotics trafficking.

The findings of this Special Report must serve as a basis for immediate and appropriate action against this threat to the United States and our democratic neighbors. Castro and his totalitarian regime must be fully exposed and held accountable for their crimes against humanity. As Chairman of the Senate Drug Enforcement Caucus, I intend to join with my Senate colleagues and the international community to seek condemnation and action against the Cuban dictator.

The United States Senate and the American people owe a great debt of thanks to the Cuban American National Foundation for its vigilance against Communist repression and terrorism. Through its expertise and vision, it has again established that it is the national resource in the debate on Cuban-American affairs.

Senator Paula Hawkins  
Chairman  
Senate Drug Enforcement  
Caucus  
Washington, D.C.

October, 1983





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# 1

## *The Castro Connection*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Through extensive Senate and House Congressional Hearings, the indictment of four senior Cuban government officials, and recently declassified reports by the Department of State and Department of Justice, a public record has been established regarding the undeniable role of the Cuban government in narcotics trafficking. The facts reveal:

#### FINDINGS

- 1) The Government of Cuba is directly involved in the production and trafficking of narcotics with the goal of promoting addiction, violent crime, corruption, and obtaining hard currency
- 2) Cuban Government narcotics profits are used to finance and promote terrorism throughout the Americas
- 3) Cuban Intelligence Agents (D.G.I.) entered the United States during the Mariel boatlift and have established a narcotics trafficking network

#### BLUEPRINT FOR ACTION

- 1) Condemnation and inspection of Cuba by the United Nations and the Organization of American States
- 2) Impose trade and loan sanctions on Cuba
- 3) Establish Radio Marti to inform the Cuban people of Castro's crimes
- 4) Further investigation by Congress, FBI, DEA, and the Department of State
- 5) Extradition of Jaime Guillot-Lara and senior Cuban government officials



# 2

## The Guillot-Lara Case/Castro Officials Indicted

On November 15, 1982, four close aides to Fidel Castro, including two influential members of the Central Committee of Cuba's Communist Party, were indicted on charges of smuggling narcotics into the United States. Stanley Marcus, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, and his assistant, Richard Gregorie, led the investigation of the Jaime Guillot-Lara case, which resulted in these important indictments. Through this thorough investigation the federal government gained crucial information relating to the communist drug conspiracy, among those indicted were:

*RENE RODRIGUEZ-CRUZ*, a senior official of the D.G.I., the Cuban intelligence service, and a ranking member of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee. It was he who helped organize the Cuban boatlift to the United States.

*ALDO SANTAMARIA-CUADRADO*, a Vice-Admiral of the Cuban Navy and a member of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee. He is charged with having supervised the protection and resupplying of ships transporting drugs from Colombia to the United States by way of Cuba.

*FERNANDO RAVELO-RENEDO*, a former Cuban Ambassador to Colombia, and *GONZALO BASSOLS-SUAREZ*, a former minister-counsel of the Cuban Embassy in the Colombian Capital and a member of the Cuban Communist Party.

The Cuban officials were charged with acts specifically aimed at facilitating the importation of drugs into the United States and at circumventing the interdiction efforts of the United States.

In addition to the Cuban officials, two other indicted defendants still remain fugitives, *JAIME GUILLOT-LARA* and *JULIAN LOSADA*. Jaime Guillot-Lara was located, arrested and held in a Mexican jail based on an earlier United States narcotics indictment. However, the Mexican Government released him and he disappeared.

Guillot-Lara is believed to have fled to Nicaragua. He and the other Castro aides remain fugitives from justice. During an interview with Colombian journalists in October 1982, Fidel Castro described Guillot as, "a good friend of Cuba."

Jaime Guillot-Lara, a Colombian national, is a major marijuana, cocaine and methaqualone trafficker whose drug activities have been known to DEA since at least 1976. He is the documented owner of, or has interest in, many seagoing vessels capable of carrying tons of marijuana. A total of 2.5 million pounds of marijuana, 25 million methaqualone tablets and 80 pounds of cocaine were documented as having been sent to the United States by Guillot from 1977-1981.



In his testimony on April 30, 1983, U.S. Attorney Stanley Marcus testified that the Guillot-Lara case involved testimony and corroborative evidence of what is defined in legal jargon as a "chain conspiracy," that is, a conspiracy beginning with the growers and drug merchants in Colombia, continuing through the middlemen and exporters, to shippers and ship crews, including ranking officials of the government of Cuba, who agreed to allow Cuba to be used as a loading station and source of supplies for ships transporting and smuggling drugs into the United States; to crew members and off-loaders from the United States who pick up drugs from ships off the United States coast; to warehousemen who store the drugs in the United States; and finally, to distributors who sell the drugs wholesale and retail on the streets of the United States. Some of the drug smugglers in this chain conspiracy were motivated by politics, some were motivated by power, most were motivated by greed and some were motivated by a combination of all of these factors.

The evidence introduced at the February trial came primarily from three witnesses: Juan Crump, David Perez and Mario Estevez Gonzalez.

Crump is a Colombian lawyer and narcotics trafficker who acted as middleman between Jaime Guillot-Lara and ranking officials of the Cuban government who permitted him to send narcotics ships through Cuban waters to evade the U.S. interdiction effort. These same Cuban officials reprovisioned these drug-laden ships from Cuban ports. Crump was close friends with the Cuban Ambassador to Colombia, Fernando Ravelo-Renedo, and his Minister-Counselor Gonzalo Bassols-Suarez. These two Cuban officials opened the door to other officials necessary to make the supply line work.

David Perez, the second witness, is a Cuban-American drug trafficker who arranged to pick up the drugs off the United States coast and distribute them through South Florida.

Mario Estevez Gonzalez, the third witness, is a Cuban government agent who infiltrated this country during the Mariel Boatlift in 1980. On instruction from Cuban government officials, he trafficked in narcotics in this country and delivered drug proceeds back to his Cuban control officers.

The evidence adduced at trial revealed that late in 1979 Crump met with Ravelo (the Cuban Ambassador to Colombia), Bassols (his First Minister), Rene Rodriguez-Cruz, president of the Cuban Institute for Friendship with Peoples, (Instituto Cubano De Amistad Con Los Pueblos (ICAP)) and Guillot-Lara. At that meeting Guillot-Lara first asked if he could use Cuba as a landing and resupply station for his drug boats and planes. Between March and July of 1980 Crump continued his negotiations with Ravelo, Bassols, Guillot-Lara and others. Finally, the Cuban Ambassador indicated to Crump that he, Ravelo, had received permission from "Havana" to land drug boats in Cuba. The Cuban officials and Crump worked out a procedure to insure Cuban naval protection for these narcotics vessels. Guillot-Lara's boats would use the name Viviana, the name of Crump's baby daughter, as a code to indicate to the Cuban Navy that the drug boats should be allowed to proceed in Cuban waters, be protected and resupplied. Crump went to Havana, Cuba, on August 14, 1980 and visited Rene Rodriguez-Cruz, to confirm the procedure agreed to by Ambassador Ravelo.

During the same time period the Cuban connection was being worked out, Jaime Guillot-Lara was meeting with David Perez to arrange for the off-loading of Guillot-Lara's drug boats in the Caribbean. Perez agreed to receive drugs sent by Guillot-Lara from Colombia through Cuba to the United States where Perez would find American buyers. Perez testified that he sent off-load boats and crews to the area of Guincho Key, about 16 miles off the north central coast of Cuba. The off-load boats were to pick up approximately ten million methaqualone tablets and multi-ton loads of marijuana from the mothership, Viviana, hiding in Cuban waters. The off-load boats were then to take the drugs to the area of Riding Rocks in the Bahamas, where speed boats would take the drugs into South Florida.

A variety of problems developed as the plan unfolded. Perez testified that he was forced to go to Guincho Key himself when two of his off-load boats met with mishaps. One ran aground and the



other never arrived. Perez went into Cuban waters in the area of Paredon Grande in November, 1980 aboard a boat called the Lazy Lady, a ship owned by Hector Gonzalez-Quinones, a Cuban Government agent then known as Frank Bonilla, and captained by another Cuban government agent, Mario Estevez Gonzalez, who was a key witness at the trial.

The evidence disclosed that upon entering Cuban waters, the Lazy Lady was escorted by two Cuban gunboats to Paredon Grande where they anchored next to Guillot-Lara's drug boat, the Viviana. Hours later, Perez, Bonilla and Estevez were separately taken aboard a 72-foot shrimp boat where Perez was welcomed by two Cuban officials he later identified as Aldo Santamaria-Cuadrado, Vice Admiral of the Cuban Navy, and Rene Rodriguez-Cruz, the Cuban President of ICAP. When Perez acknowledged to Rodriguez-Cruz that the Viviana was carrying a methaqualone shipment, Rodriguez replied he was "happy" that Perez was bringing so many drugs into the United States. Perez testified that he had several conversations with Rene Rodriguez-Cruz during the three days they were in Cuban waters waiting for the Lazy Lady to be repaired and that he was told that some of the money used to purchase the drugs in Colombia was provided by the Cuban government.

Perez further testified that he understood from conversations with Jaime Guillot-Lara that the Cuban government expected to receive approximately \$800,000 from the sale of 10 million methaqualone pills and approximately 23,000 pounds of marijuana.

The third witness was Mario Estevez-Gonzalez, the captain of the Lazy Lady. He testified at trial that he was an agent of the Cuban Government, first sent to the United States in 1980 in the Mariel Boatlift to infiltrate the anti-Castro, Miami-based, group known as "Alpha 66." Later he was instructed by his superiors in the Cuban Ministry of the Interior to infiltrate the drug dealers ring in the Bahamas and learn how to buy and sell drugs in the United States. Estevez's control officer told him "it is important for us to fill the United States with drugs." Estevez explained how he came to captain the Lazy Lady to Paredon Grande.

He testified that his Cuban government control officer ordered him to go to Bimini in the Bahamas in late September or early October 1980 to meet with the Cuban government agent known as Frank Bonilla, the owner of the Lazy Lady. Bonilla ordered Estevez to captain the ship, with Perez on board, to Guincho Key where they were to meet the Viviana. The reason for this trip was that they could not locate the two off-load boats Perez had originally sent out. At Guincho Key, approximately 16 miles from the Cuban coast, the Lazy Lady developed engine trouble and was forced to go to Paredon Grande in Cuba where the mothership, the Viviana, was anchored.

Estevez also testified that he, Bonilla, and Perez met with Rodriguez, Aldo Santamaria Cuadrado, and two high-ranking members of the Castro government who were safeguarding the 10 million methaqualone tablets on the mothership Viviana. Estevez testified that Santamaria, introduced himself as Rene Baeza Rodriguez and joked about Estevez's drug smuggling. "He touched me, put his hand on me and said to me 'Finally, you're going to have a pharmacy in Miami. . .'"

Estevez said that, acting upon orders from his Cuban government control officers, he smuggled cocaine into the United States and carried more than two million dollars in proceeds from cocaine trafficking back to Cuba.

# *The Role of Cuba in* **3** *International Terrorism and Subversion*

During hearings\* before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, testimony was heard from:

Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Sergio Pinon and Daniel Benitez, Special Agents of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement

Gerardo Peraza, former senior official of DGI, Cuba's General Intelligence Directorate, who defected to the United States in 1971

It was revealed that:

Cuba is trafficking in narcotics and arms

Narcotics enter the United States (from Colombia) via Cuba

Cuban boats help smugglers by using radar to avoid detection by the United States Coast Guard

The DGI has infiltrated the United States at various levels

Important excerpts of the testimony follow:

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\*Hearings before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 97th Congress, 2nd Session on *The Role of Cuba in International Terrorism and Subversion*. [February 26, March 4, 11, 12, 1982]. U.S.G.P.O. 1982



Senator JEREMIAH DENTON:

Too many in our country still adhere to the belief that Fidel Castro is a romantic revolutionary who is simply carrying the standard for the poor and oppressed people of Cuba. The mass exodus of 130,000 Cubans from the port of Mariel to the United States in the spring of 1980 should help enlighten them. This event was totally orchestrated by Castro. . . . there is no way to accurately estimate the number of DGI agents who entered under this guise of refugees to join those already in place in the United States.

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Senator DENTON. Would you describe the various departments of the DGI and their respective functions?

Mr. PERAZA. Yes. The principal function of the Directorate of Intelligence was penetration and recruitment in the United States of America. For this reason, it was divided—before the Soviet Union took over the control of the intelligence—in three main sections.

Section 3 was the one which worked directly against the CIA. It worked with the principal center in New York; and the other centers in Canada and Puerto Rico. . . .

. . . the Cuban service sent to the Soviet Union 25 intelligence officers, 20 to 25 officers for the illegal center, 30 officers of the military counterintelligence, for the internal counterintelligence service from 30 to 50 officers, and this is out of the country.

Within Cuba, you have the military counterintelligence school, with Soviet officers who train officers of the military counterintelligence at the rate of about 200 officers per year. This military counterintelligence school is probably one of the most advanced counterintelligence schools on the continent. It not only uses Soviet instructors; they have instructors from the PLO and other terrorist organizations.

This school of military counterintelligence has been visited by the most famous terrorists in the world. For instance, Carlos himself, that Senator Denton referred to, visited that school after having gone to the Patrice Lumumba School in Moscow, because that school has the capability to train a group, an individual, or a leader of the highest level, such as Allende who visited that school, Amilcar Cabral of Cape Verde and São Tomé Islands, the former Portuguese colony.

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Senator DENTON.

I want to welcome our witnesses, Sergio Pinon and Daniel Benitez, special agents with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, who, in the midst of the press of urgent duties, have found the time to come to Washington, D.C., and testify in front of the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism. They will be testifying on terrorist and intelligence activities of the Cuban Government in south Florida. . . .



... Last Friday, February 26, 1982, Gerardo Peraza, a former senior official of Cuban intelligence, the DGI, appeared before this subcommittee. Mr. Peraza joined Fidel Castro's rebel army in 1958, rose through the ranks of Cuban intelligence, and received training in Moscow.

His final assignment was at the DGI center in London as a member of the Cuban embassy staff, with the cover title of Second Secretary. In 1971, Gerardo Peraza sought refuge in the United States. His testimony before the subcommittee was his first public appearance since leaving Cuba. . . .

... Mr. Peraza testified that between 1958 and 1970, the Cuban DGI and the Soviet KGB cooperated on intelligence collection. In 1968, a committee of chiefs of the intelligence service personally offered intelligence that the DGI had collected in the United States to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, and other countries in the Soviet Bloc.

Beginning in 1970, the Cuban intelligence service was placed under the direction of the KGB. It was directly supervised by a Soviet colonel, Viktor Simenov. Prior to Peraza's departure for his assignment in London, he was required to discuss his operational plans with Simenov, who controlled the expenditure of funds for operations. Before 1970, intelligence plans were approved by the Cuban chief of intelligence. After 1970, the DGI budget was prepared by Simenov and was sent to the Soviet Union for approval.

Before 1970, Cuba lacked adequate resources to mount a major intelligence offensive against the United States. However, in 1970, with financial resources furnished by the Soviet Union, the DGI was able to recruit about 100 intelligence officers in 2 weeks.

A substantial amount of Soviet money was used to buy vehicles and technical equipment and to pay for the expenses of placing the agents. In effect, the DGI now had what amounted to an unlimited budget.

Each of the 100 intelligence officials who left Cuba in 1970 for assignment abroad had to provide a copy of his infiltration plan to a Soviet officer. In addition, the DGI officers had to provide Soviet officers with the true names of all their agents working in the United States. Prior to that point, only the pseudonyms of the agents had been provided to the U.S.S.R.

Mr. Peraza also stated that the DGI is in no way a partner of the KGB; it is a subordinate entity, taking its direction from agents of the Kremlin.

Mr. Peraza stated that, in exchange for financial support of its intelligence apparatus, Cuba was required to direct its operations toward collection of intelligence information of interest to the Soviet Union. This included intelligence, military, economic, and political matters. According to Peraza, the Cubans were more readily able to obtain this type of information than were the Soviets, for the Cubans were not so easily detected.

Mr. Peraza said that during the late 1960's and early 1970's the DGI exploited weaknesses it perceived in the U.S. intelligence community to install agents in the United States. He further indicated that the United States could not detect that activity and that all Cuban intelligence forces were ordered to prepare penetrations against the United States in any country in which there was an identifiable U.S. intelligence target.

He testified that DGI agents in Great Britain had the principal



mission of spying on British citizens in order to penetrate the U.S. activities in the United Kingdom. DGI operatives in Spain spied on citizens there, with the principal objective of penetrating the United States.

Mr. Peraza confirmed that even the Cuban involvement in Angola was seen primarily as a step toward the defeat of the United States, which is the ultimate and exclusive target of all Soviet and Cuban operations.

Peraza stated that he was personally aware of successful infiltration of high-ranking DGI agents into the U.S. Government. He claimed even the U.S. Senate had been penetrated.

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STATEMENT BY SERGIO PINON AND DANIEL BENITEZ  
(Florida Department of Law Enforcement):

The effort to overcome these obstacles has taken several years to bear fruit, but at this time, sources known to the Department of Law Enforcement have provided information which links some of the drug traffickers to Cuba. For example, intelligence information indicated that Cuba has guaranteed the Colombian drug shipments to persons who the Castro government will from time to time designate. Not having to pay for the drug shipment and being able to sell it on consignment enables well-chosen drug dealers to become rich, powerful, and influential quickly at small risk and without a large capital investment. The immediate advantage of this activity gives the new drug smuggler a great potential for fighting over this preferred treatment. At any time, one new group could be told to wipe out an existing group for any reason, and then take its place. We have not seen the beginning of drug wars should this happen.

Sources also state that Castro provides safe haven and harbor to those mother ships loaded with drugs traveling through Cuban waters. Allegations are also that he charges a toll for the use of Cuban waters, Cuban patrol escorts, and the unlawful use of Cuban flags to prevent boarding and seizure by U.S. authorities.

We have sources that not only have reported this information but also claimed to have been involved in their planning and execution.

The problem is that these witnesses and sources are very fearful for their lives and the lives of their families due to the widespread corruption as well as the violence that drug smuggling organizations are known to take.

Before progress is made, law enforcement must regain the confidence of the public. We will provide a copy of a transcribed tape obtained by Special Agent Benitez and me from a source who was involved in some smuggling operations and its connections in Cuba. Other sources have stated that Cuba is currently harvesting marijuana to provide some competition to Colombia and Jamaica. This information is not verified but if it is true, it would point to a larger involvement by the Cuban Government than previously thought. Although no more concrete proof can be presented at this time as to Cuban ties to narcotic traffic in the United States, we are hopeful that what we have presented will be used as the basis to provide resources and manpower in order to properly investigate this alleged activity of the Cuban Government. By so doing, the solutions to this problem can be implemented.

In 1979, a known anti-Castro revolutionary Cuban exile, Reinol Rodriguez, was shot at by an unknown assailant from a moving vehicle as he approached his home. The shots were fired from a silenced machinegun, but missed the victim, Rodriguez, as he dove down to the floor of his vehicle.

The Florida Department of Law Enforcement has received several unconfirmed reports from sources that Cuba holds Mr. Reinol



Rodriguez responsible for the assassination of Carlos Muniz, a suspected Cuban agent who was also involved in a travel agency which sponsored flights to Cuba and Puerto Rico. The assassination of Carlos Muniz was credited to Omega-7, a secret, anti-Castro terrorist organization in the United States and Puerto Rico.

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Mr. PINON. To further illustrate the links possessed by foreign agents in south Florida, we will refer to other cases made by other agencies involving the illegal sale of weapons to persons or corporations who will make them available to governments unfriendly to the United States. This specific information was received from Joseph Benitez, the coordinator of the President's Task Force of Florida Crime chaired by Vice President George Bush. Joseph Benitez is currently assigned to the Treasury Department. Due to the sensitivity of these cases, only very general information will be released at this time. However, more complete information can be released during an executive session. A certain gunshop linked to Cuba has been involved in the illegal sale of guns and machine-guns to foreign countries. Indictments of both Cubans and Americans have been obtained for conspiracy to deal, ship, and transport firearms from Miami, Fla., to foreign countries between August 1, 1979, and January 29, 1979, without being properly licensed. The firearms ultimately were sent to Nicaragua leftist guerrillas. Information was also received involving a Russian agent who was involved in buying and shipping over 150 firearms to a leftist group attempting to overthrow the present government of Jamaica.


On January 13, 1982, I assisted Special Agent Juan Perez of the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration in the recovery of two explosive devices. Upon arriving at the scene, we noted that the devices were two oval-shaped grenades, steel casing, smooth finish, with a seam in the middle—fully active explosives with unidentifiable content weighing 9 ounces each. The grenades were identified as being U.S.S.R. RGD-5 hand grenades made in 1976. Intelligence sources reported that the grenades were brought into the United States by an alleged Cuban DGI agent who was also involved in smuggling narcotics via Cuba, from Colombia to Miami.

[Photographs of Russian grenades on pages 18-19.]

Mr. PINON. According to sources, these grenades were part of a shipment of over 200 that were brought into the United States. Sources further indicated that the agent is involved with the M-19 Colombian terrorist organization and has taken shipments of weapons from Cuba to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador and Nicaragua. One source reported that the illegal profits of narcotics was being used to finance subversive and terrorist activities.


At present, we have had three separate bombings in the city of Miami involving Russian RGD grenades, and a possible fourth incident still not positively identified. . . .





*Photo introduced at Hearings before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 97th Congress, 2nd Sess., 1982*





*Photo introduced at Hearings before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 97th Congress, 2nd Sess., 1982*



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... These cases are still under investigation by the Miami Police Department.

These incidents were allegedly perpetrated by assailants under the guidance of Cuban agents for no apparent reasons, but positively to cause the authorities to concentrate on anti-Castro groups, thus enhancing their capability to continue their intelligence work. There is still in excess of 200 Russian grenades somewhere in the United States to be used any time in the future for the sole purpose of creating death or destruction.

In closing we would like to say that we have made several observations:

One, how some of the anti-Castro groups were infiltrated.

Two, the ability of persons who work for foreign governments to penetrate not only professional fields, but also Government agencies, as well as other social service agencies, allegedly including law enforcement agencies.

Three, we have seen how a few persons given the right timing and the resources, can precipitate incidents that will cost millions of dollars to the taxpayers and produce problems that will take years to solve.

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SENATOR DENTON:

This testimony is mind-boggling to me, and I thought I knew something about terrorist activity in the United States. We have a case here of a man who is a DGI affiliate, if not an agent. He is engaged in teaching young Miami blacks to firebomb schools in the black community, and is also associated with an institutionalized effort in more than one university to recruit people not to sign up for the draft, is that correct?

Mr. PINON. That is correct.

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, sir, it is.

Senator DENTON. Reportedly, the Department of State has evidence that links the Cuban Government to drug smuggling activities in the United States. They cite the case of Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colombian now in jail in Mexico, who claims to have funneled arms and money to a Colombian leftist group in return for Cuban aid in smuggling marihuana shipments to the United States.

Have you, in the course of your investigations, come across evidence or information indicating that Cuba is actively involved in any way in drug smuggling into the United States? If so, would you please describe that evidence or information?

Mr. PINON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We have one source whom we arrested on narcotics charges. This source was involved, also, in the Mariel boatlift with subjects that we arrested. He has made several trips to Cuba. This same subject provided information advising us that narcotics trafficking was coming via Cuba from Colombia.

Specifically explained, when the boats left Colombia, they left with the Cuban flag in order to let the Cuban Government know that they were coming in friendly. The Cuban Government boats would come to the mother ships to escort them into the Cuban key, which is called Cayo Paredon Grande; that is the name of the key. The mother ship will be escorted there and it is met by Cuban officers, who will then view the exchange when boats coming from the



United States would come to Cayo Paredon Grande to transfer the narcotics from the mother ship into the smaller vessels.

Those boats are escorted to a limit close to the United States, possibly around the 10-mile limit, where they will take the Cuban flag and throw it into the water. The Cuban Government has advised these drug smugglers that as long as they fly the Cuban flag, the U.S. Coast Guard will not interfere so as not to cause an international incident.

Senator DENTON. Let me see if I have this straight. A ship comes from Colombia loaded with marihuana and passes around to the north side of Cuba. Is not Cayo Paredon Grande on the north side?

Mr. PINON. Yes, sir. There is an area between the Bahamas—about a 12- to 17-mile area between the Bahamas and Cuba, and that is where that key is located.

Senator DENTON. As a signal, that ship, which is Colombian, hoists the Cuban flag to indicate that it is friendly, and is escorted into the rather protected waters of the key, Cayo Paredon Grande. Other smaller craft come alongside; the marihuana is transferred to them.

Is there something that goes from the smaller craft to the Cuban Government? These smaller craft are coming from the United States. Are they giving up anything?

Mr. PINON. Yes, sir. At times, the smugglers will provide the Cuban officials with goods coming from the United States, such as televisions, Betamax machines. Anything that they will request from them, they will bring them to the government officials in Cuba.

We do not know if that is part of the payment or if that is just a compliment to continue their operations.

Senator DENTON. Are there ever any weapons, small arms, included in that?

Mr. PINON. According to our sources, as soon as they get near the Cuban waters, when the two Cuban boats come to escort them in, they have to surrender their weapons. When they leave Cuba and they get escorted away up to the proximity of the United States, which is approximately a 10-mile limit, or probably a little further away, they will give the weapons back and they will come to the United States.

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SENATOR DENTON:

Do these ships leave Colombia with the Cuban flag, or do they only hoist that Cuban flag as they get near Cuba?

Mr. PINON. That is correct. When they get near Cuba, they put up the Cuban flag.

Senator DENTON. Who unloads these ships? Who oversees the unloading? Are there any Cuban officers present?

Mr. BENITEZ. It is alleged that there are Cuban patrol boats present all the time, but they do not get involved in the offloading; they merely watch it. It is also alleged that they charge money for the actual amount transferred. They weigh it, or they supervise its being weighed, and then they charge accordingly.

Senator DENTON. In other words, the Cuban Government allegedly is receiving money for overseeing and permitting that operation?

Mr. BENITEZ. That is correct; providing safe harbor and, at the same time, charging a toll.

Senator DENTON. Do you have any idea what kind of money is involved, how much?

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, sir. There is a figure that was quoted to us; I would have to take a minute to look for it. Excuse me. [Pause.]

I have found it. The figure of \$50,000 for any vessel which is



larger than 10 tons—excuse me, no larger than 10 tons—is what I have on my notes.

Senator DENTON. Fifty thousand dollars for a 10-ton vessel, more or less?

Mr. BENITEZ. More or less.

Senator DENTON. Ten tons is pretty small. Are you talking about the mother ship which is bringing the marihuana or the smaller vessels which are coming from the United States?

Mr. BENITEZ. It is not exactly clear, but I believe that the smaller vessels are the ones that pay as they are loaded. By "smaller vessels," we mean yacht-size vessels, as opposed to mother ships.

Senator DENTON. That could be a pretty good sum on just one operation. Could it not?

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. In connection with these offloadings and loadings, have you heard the names of the following Cuban officers: Colonels Angel and Gustavo?

Mr. PINON. Yes, sir, Angel and Gustavo.

Senator DENTON. What do you know about them?

Mr. BENITEZ. They are alleged to be agents in Cuba of the Ministry of State, and these are the code words that the vessels radio to obtain a Coast Guard patrol boat escort when they get near Cuban waters.

Senator DENTON. What role did the source who gave this information play in the operation?

Mr. BENITEZ. He has been directly involved in at least two off-load operations and the planning of several others.

Mr. PINON. He was the boat captain.

Mr. BENITEZ. He was the boat captain, and he has been involved in other smuggling operations.

Mr. PINON. Mr. Chairman, if I may, also, this same source was also involved with Mr. Romeo, so he had established a relationship with these two colonels. Now, he only knew them by first name; he did not know them by last name. But he had met with them on several occasions. . . .

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Senator DENTON. How did the grenades get into the country? Do you know?

Mr. PINON. Yes, sir, they were brought in by an individual who was a suspected agent of the Cuban Government. We would like to refrain from identifying him because of ongoing investigation still pending. But according to the informant, this individual is also involved in large-scale narcotics smuggling into the United States, and the informant specifically stated that this individual has been taking shipments of weapons to El Salvador and Nicaragua during the former government of Somoza, supplying leftist guerrillas with weapons.

The source also informed us that this subject went to Cuba on several occasions with him and actually obtained weapons from the Cuban Government, and these grenades were brought into the United States some time in 1979 by this same subject.

Senator DENTON. Would it be fair to infer from what you know that there is a large-scale Colombia-Cuba connection on marihuana introduction into at least southern Florida and that there are probably many more weapons than you have specific knowledge of; and with the training which you know about and the subversion in terms of not registering for the draft and the subversion in terms of teaching youth to bomb schools, that there is a growing and



much greater potential in that area for terrorism than has been so far demonstrated?

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would think that there is a much greater potential than has been demonstrated at this time.

Mr. PINON. Mr. Chairman, I will also add another interesting point that became known to us through a separate source who is still out there in the field working for us. He advised us that presently, the Government of Cuba has been providing marihuana to the smugglers that has been grown in Cuba, and the Cuban boats are using a radar system to detect the U.S. Coast Guard in order to find a clear way into the United States to assist them in the smuggling. And this source is still working for us out in the field.

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AMBASSADOR THOMAS O. ENDERS:

For the first time, Mr. Chairman, we now also have detailed and reliable information linking Cuba to traffic in narcotics as well as arms. Since 1980, the Castro regime has been using a Colombian narcotics ring to funnel arms as well as funds to Colombian M-19 guerrillas. This narcotics ring was led by Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colombia drug-trafficker now in custody in Mexico. He has admitted to working for Havana in purchasing arms for the M-19. We have information that Guillot traveled twice to Cuba since October 1981 and that on the second visit he received \$700,000 from the Cuban Government to purchase arms for the M-19 guerrillas. Last October, he played a principal role in transferring the arms he purchased from a ship to a Colombian plane hijacked by the M-19. In addition to arms, Guillot reportedly also transferred funds to the guerrillas through an employee of a Panamanian bank. He maintained contact with the Cuban diplomatic mission in Bogota, including the Ambassador, until that mission was closed.

In return for Guillot's services, the Cubans facilitated the ring's trafficking by permitting mother ships carrying marihuana to take sanctuary in Cuban waters while awaiting feeder boats from the Bahamas and Florida. According to a relative of Guillot, one such mother ship detained by Cuban authorities was released when Guillot protested to the Cuban Ambassador in Bogota.

Guillot himself has also admitted that a future shipment of arms was to be sent to an unspecified group in Bolivia. These arms, according to Guillot, were to be supplied by an individual in Miami named Johnny. Johnny has been identified as Johnny Crump, a narcotics and arms trafficker now detained in Miami on narcotics charges.

We will continue, Mr. Chairman, to follow this case with extreme interest since it is the first firm information we have which implicates Cuba in narcotics trafficking. It also confirms through an independent source what we have suspected, that despite Cuban denials, Cuba has provided arms to the Colombian M-19 guerrillas in addition to training them. . . .

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...I think if I could put this in perspective, Mr. Chairman, the covert strategy for exporting armed revolution and terrorism is more sophisticated than Cuban efforts in the 1960's. The new Cuban approach no longer centers support solely on armed forces, but combines support for revolutionary groups with propaganda, youth training courses, scholarships, and bilateral economic/techni-



cal assistance. They have some flexibility in tactics but the main-spring of Cuba's policy remains the development of strong paramilitary forces in target countries like Colombia to provide the muscle for revolutionary groups regardless of the path to power they choose.

Of course, Nicaragua is now collaborating in the attempt to impose new Cuban-style regimes in Central America. Such regimes are so incompetent, economically, and so repressive of individual liberties that their citizens will see their only hope in flight, often to the United States. The rapidly growing number of Indian refugees—now more than 12,000—who have fled Nicaragua to Honduras are just the most recent manifestation of the despair which moves people to abandon their communities for safety elsewhere.

We know the human tragedy of refugee movements. We also know the enormous social and economic burdens they place on the societies which receive them. We ourselves have seen the crime, the skyjackings, the huge welfare costs and social tensions the Mariel migration brought to the communities of this country. For small countries in Central America or even Mexico, the consequences could be too much to accommodate. The pressures can easily destabilize the weak, creating the chaos that gives revolutionaries new opportunities. Whether or not it is part of the design to export revolution, it at least serves that purpose.

I think it is worthwhile remembering that Cuba's investment of energy, money and agents would not be possible without Soviet help. Soviet assistance, now totaling well over \$3 billion a year, which is the equivalent of a quarter of Cuba's GNP, enables Cuba to maintain the second largest and the best equipped military force in Latin America and to channel significant resources to insurgencies and terrorism abroad. Cuba's new offensive since 1978 has been accompanied by ever-increasing Soviet arms buildup in Cuba including Mig-23 Floggers and 66,000 tons of supplies in 1981 alone. Having such a sophisticated military establishment enhances Cuba's ability to foster and export revolution.

We must be clear about Cuba. It is a Soviet surrogate. Its support for subversion derives from its own deeply based ideological conviction. It is a fundamental tenet of the Cuban revolution.

The Cuban leadership today is made up largely of the veterans who 23 years ago came to power through violent revolution. They have developed "armed struggle" into an ideological precept and way of life. Promoting "armed struggle" is not just a tactic of foreign policy, it is what reassures them that they are still revolutionaries.

This deep-seated drive to re-create their own guerrilla experience elsewhere is strengthened by hopes of creating allies and keeping Washington's attention focused away from Havana. Hoping that the United States will be domestically and internationally hamstrung on El Salvador, Cuba seeks to compound our problems by creating new ones—for example, in Guatemala or Colombia. This drive, however, makes Cuba increasingly prone to rash decisions and tactical mistakes, and more willing to sacrifice the lives and resources of foreign guerrilla groups in operations that may prove disastrous to the guerrillas but advantageous to Havana.

We must make no mistake: The Castro regime has made a business of violent revolution. Our response is also clear. We will not accept, we do not believe the countries of the region will accept that the future of the Caribbean Basin be manipulated from Havana. It must be determined by the countries themselves.



## Castro's intelligence officers assist narcotics traffickers 4

Testifying before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs\*, Ambassador Thomas D. Boyatt, United States Ambassador to Colombia, revealed that the Cuban government is directly involved in smuggling narcotics into the United States while smuggling arms and guerrillas to Marxist terrorists.

During hearings\*\* by the Senate Drug Enforcement Caucus, The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism and The Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Ambassador Boyatt also expressed his concerns about the Cuban connection.

Important excerpts of the testimony follow:

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\*Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, April 20, 21, 22, 1982. *International Narcotics Control*. [U.S.G.P.O., 1982]

\*\*Transcript from hearings before the Senate Drug Enforcement Caucus, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism and the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, April 30, 1983, "The Cuban Government Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic".



## STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR BOYATT:

Before the U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on Foreign Affairs, April 20, 21, 22, 1982:

Mr. Chairman, since my last congressional testimony on the narcotics situation in Colombia, there has been a very startling development which seriously threatens both the United States and Colombia. It is a matter with which this committee should be fully seized in the national interest.

The United States now has detailed and reliable evidence, as Ambassador Enders underlined in his March 12 testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, that intelligence officers of the Cuban Government have been assisting Colombian narcotics traffickers in transporting drugs to the United States and using these same traffickers; their same infrastructure, their boats, planes and personnel to smuggle arms and guerrillas to Marxist terrorist groups dedicated to overthrowing Colombia's freely elected government.

I realize that this statement will generate a strong reaction from apologists for totalitarian Cuba and from those romantics who, as an act of faith, believe that every group of terrorists in Latin America somehow represent the downtrodden masses against oppressions by an oligarchy.

In Colombia, this construct is nonsense. There is nothing romantic about the killing, the robbing, and the kidnapping perpetrated on a daily basis by Colombian terrorists, so-called revolutionary groups. There is nothing romantic about threats made against myself and my wife and children on a frequent basis. And there is nothing romantic about efforts by Cuban officials to use drug traffickers to send guns to Colombian terrorists dedicated to progressive reform in that country.

The Cuban connection with drug traffickers as a vehicle for harming the United States and shipping arms clandestinely to Colombia and elsewhere to help terrorists destabilize democratic governments must be exposed, understood, admitted and countered.

Before Joint Senate Committee Hearings, April 30, 1983:

AMBASSADOR BOYATT — I am gratified to you, and to the other Senators, for this effort at publicizing a situation — the Cuban Connection — which I consider today and have considered, as you know, for several months to be a major threat to the United States.

I would like to begin with a quote from my friend and former colleague at the State Department, Ray Cline, which appeared in a 1980 magazine article when he said this: "Terrorism today is more than an intrinsic, inescapable consequence of the flaw of character of mankind. It is a form of low intensity warfare. It is intended by those who finance it, arm it and ideologically inspire it to weaken and ultimately to dissolve the fabric of civilized behavior and societies built upon the moral imperative of preserving the political and economic freedoms of individual citizens."

SENATOR HAWKINS — Could four senior members of the Cuban Government be involved in drug trafficking without the knowledge and approval of Fidel Castro, in your mind?

AMBASSADOR BOYATT — No, Ma'am.

SENATOR HAWKINS — Do you believe that the Government of Cuba is supplying guns to terrorists in Latin America?



AMBASSADOR BOYATT — I not only believe it, I think that the evidence is overwhelming in that regard.

SENATOR HAWKINS — What is the relationship of the gun smuggling to drug trafficking, in your mind?

AMBASSADOR BOYATT — Well, the Guillot-Lara case proves that the drug trafficking structure, the same people, the same planes, the same means of transportation were used to carry marijuana northward to the United States to hurt the United States and to bring guns south to Colombia to supply those guns to the M-19 for the purpose of overthrowing the freely elected government of Colombia, and that is a matter of evidence and a matter of record. I think that is indisputable.



*U.S. Drug Enforcement  
Administration testifies  
Cuba plays direct  
role in narcotics trade*

Mr. Francis M. Mullen, Jr., Acting Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, testified before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism that Cuba is playing a direct role in the trafficking of narcotics into the United States\*.

Important excerpts of his testimony follow:

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\*Hearing before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 97th Congress, 2nd Session: *Drug Enforcement Administration Oversight and Budget Authorization and S.2320*. April 23, 1982. [U.S.G.P.O. 1982]



SENATOR DENTON:

The direct relationship between drug trafficking and abuse and the incidence of crime is demonstrated daily by reports from authoritative sources. These reports provide the grist for many press accounts. I saw one NBC television documentary the night before last about cocaine in particular but drugs of pleasure in general. There is much spoken about it, much like the weather, but we need to do more about it, obviously, because the violations and abuse are increasing.

A particularly graphic example of this relationship between crime and drug abuse, which was cited at last year's oversight hearing, is the finding of a Temple University Medical School study that 243 addicts committed almost 500,000 street crimes in 10 years and that these addicts are 84 percent more likely to commit a crime when on drugs than when they were free of drugs.

Drug trafficking and abuse have far-reaching ramifications that affect our citizens and institutions in many ways. Besides the tremendous toll that drug abuse takes on its victims and the increasing level of crime in our communities, there are other costs. These costs include, to name but a few, the increased tax burden required to finance greater police protection and crime control, lost time in civilian and military work forces, less freedom of individual movement and use of personal property by our citizens, and a negative environment for our children at school.

Testimony received by the subcommittee during the recent hearings on worldwide Cuban activities revealed another alarming dimension of the drug problem that we must confront. Ambassador Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, told the subcommittee:

We [the Department of State] now also have detailed and reliable information linking Cuba to traffic in narcotics as well as arms. Since 1980, the Castro regime has been using a Colombian narcotics ring to funnel arms as well as funds to Colombian M-19 guerrillas.

The drug ring referred to was led by Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colombian who is now in custody in Mexico. Ambassador Enders went on to say:

In return for Guillot's services, the Cubans facilitated the ring's trafficking by permitting mother ships carrying marijuana to take sanctuary in Cuban waters while awaiting feeder boats from the Bahamas and Florida.

Detailed information confirming this Cuban link to drug trafficking into the United States and elsewhere was presented by Special Agents Sergio Pinon and Daniel Benitez of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. They told the subcommittee of a source, later interviewed by staff members of the subcommittee, who advised us that narcotics trafficking was coming via Cuba from Colombia.

This testimony went on to say:

When the boats left Colombia, they left with the Cuban flag in order to let the Cuban government know that they were coming in friendly. The Cuban government boats would come to the mother ships to escort them into the Cuban key, which is called Cayo Paredon Grande; . . . the mother ship will be escorted there and it is met by Cuban intelligence officers, who will then view the exchange when boats coming from the United States would come to Cayo Paredon Grande to transfer the narcotics from the mother ship into the smaller vessels.

Those boats were escorted to a limit close to the United States; . . . The Cuban Government has advised these drug smugglers that as long as they bear the Cuban flag, the U.S. Coast Guard will not interfere so as not to cause an international incident.

From a separate source, Special Agent Pinon learned that—

\* \* \* The government of Cuba has been providing marijuana to the smugglers that has been grown in Cuba, and the Cuban boats are using a radar system to detect the U.S. Coast Guard in order to find a clear way into the United States to assist them in smuggling.



It has long been alleged that subversive and terrorist groups and governments such as Cuba that encourage and support such groups have utilized drug trafficking to fund their activities. The testimony received during our Cuban hearings is consistent with those allegations and with the stated aim of the Cubans to contribute to the destabilization of the United States by encouraging and enhancing the drug trade.

There has been testimony about the Cuban mission to destabilize the United States. The link between drug traffic, arms, money, espionage, terrorism, all those links have been well established and are among the facts which I regret have not received more governmental and public dissemination.

Senator DENTON. In my opening statement I referred to prior testimony the subcommittee received confirming Cuban involvement with drug trafficking. Does the DEA have information indicating involvement of the Cuban Government in drug trafficking? If so, would you tell us about it?

Mr. MULLEN. We have had some indications of involvement of Cubans in the drug trafficking activity. I am aware of the Guillot Lara matter inasmuch as the case in which he was indicted did involve a DEA investigation. As you are aware, he is currently held in Mexico facing extradition either to Colombia or to the United States.

Recently, we prepared at DEA an intelligence report. It pertained to any indication of Cuban involvement in the drug trafficking over the past 10 or 12 years. I have reviewed that report. There are indications in this report that throughout this period there was some Cuban involvement in drug activity. However, I would not like to go into specifics in open session. I would be prepared to brief you or make this report available to you in a closed session.

Senator DENTON. Would you make that intelligence report available to the staff after this hearing?

Mr. MULLEN. Yes, we will.

Senator DENTON. Would you care to say anything on an unclassified basis about information indicating the involvement of governments other than that of Cuba in illicit drug traffic?

Mr. MULLEN. We are seeing more and more involvement on the part of terrorist groups in the drug trafficking all around the world: The Mideast, Europe, and in the Caribbean. The same standards apply. We do have some specific information which I would prefer to go into in closed session rather than open session. But there is a definite relationship between terrorist activity and drug trafficking.

Senator DENTON. Can you tell, within the restrictions of the classification of the information, anything about the motivation behind the use of drugs by the terrorists, the use of the trafficking, their participation in the trafficking? What is their end? Is it to finance or subvert sociologically or both? Or can you tell?

Mr. MULLEN. It appears basically to be to finance activities, not to use the drugs to destabilize. I would agree that it does not make unfriendly governments or terrorist organizations unhappy to see the United States with the difficult drug problem that it has, but we have not detected any activity to facilitate the drug trafficking to destabilize the populace or the Government. It is basically to finance their activities.

I mentioned, Senator, terrorist organizations. We do have some corrupt activities on the part of some governments for financial gain in drug trafficking, but I do not personally know of any government that is involved in drug trafficking for destabilizing or for income to finance terrorist activities.

Senator DENTON. Other than Cuba, perhaps.

Mr. MULLEN. Again, the information which is available to me has been made available to the intelligence agencies, and I have



heard the statements of Ambassador Boyette and others. They apparently have additional information, based on their presence in countries such as Colombia, other than that which is available to me.

The information that I am presently aware of indicates possible Cuban involvement. Perhaps our intelligence agencies, putting our information with what they have, have been able to make this link.

Senator DENTON. We would hope that that kind of interchange of information is already a matter of practice.

Mr. MULLEN. It is a matter of practice. We have held frequent meetings to make the information available.

Senator DENTON. We had public hearings in which it was made evident that officials of the Cuban Government, in that they were officers, were on the scene taking part in these operations. Other testimony from defectors was verifiable and common in the testimony of several that it is officially known by the Cuban Government and, at least, condoned.

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Senator DENTON. Could you estimate the total U.S. currency outflow resulting from international drug trafficking and to what extent this currency is finding its way to Cuba? We had some quantitative figures on that with respect to shipments and the amount they charge for the boats: \$50,000 for a certain size vessel, and so forth. Is there any kind of gross estimate of the currency outflow resulting from that trafficking?

Mr. MULLEN. The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee [NNICC] estimates that the drug industry generated \$79 billion in 1980. A good part of that does flow out of the country. I do not have an estimate as to how much is going out or how much is going to Cuba.

Do you have anything to add to that?

Mr. MONASTERO. We have information about how much it costs to put a load together coming to the United States, which is in the range of the figure you mention; but we do not have any exact estimate.

Senator DENTON. The transfer between the feeder boats and the other boats in the Cuban waters involved a \$50,000 fee for a small boat.

Mr. MULLEN. I am told that is what it costs to put a drug load together.

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*Former Cuban Intelligence  
officer says  
Castro is  
personally involved*

Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato (N.Y.) questioned Mario Estevez Gonzalez, a former member of the Cuban Intelligence Service during hearings\* held by the New York Senate Select Committee on Crime.

Mr. Estevez' testimony revealed that:

- Cuba has a network of thousands of agents within the United States engaged in multimillion dollar drug trafficking
- Castro is personally involved in drug trafficking with the goal of promoting violent crime, addiction, and corruption in the United States and financing terrorism in Latin America

Important excerpts of the testimony follow:

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\*Hearings by the New York Senate Select Committee on Crime, *Narcotics Production and Trafficking by the Cuban Intelligence Service (D.G.I.)* April 14, 1983.



SENATOR D'AMATO: In 1980, Fidel Castro sent over 125,000 Cubans to the U.S. Most of these Cubans were good, decent people who merely wished to escape the tyranny. However, as many as 25,000 to 30,000 Cubans, who are known as "Marielitos," were hardened criminals. They were dumped out of Cuba by Castro, out of the prison system; and among these 25,000 to 35,000 there were up to 3,000 agents. It has been said by some that they make our criminals and our thugs on the streets look like Sunday school students.

Even more shocking is the recent disclosure that the network in this country is a very comprehensive network with the 3,000 agents who are facilitating the trafficking of drugs. We have as our first witness this morning an individual who has testified to the Cuban connection in U.S. drug traffic. Further, the U.S. Attorney's Office in southern Florida has indicated that the testimony we are about to hear has been independently corroborated by other sources.

MARIO ESTEVEZ: At the time I was instructed to join Alpha 66, I was not aware of any mission which I would have to be dealing with drugs. However, I completed this assignment. I was responsible for sabotage in sinking two boats from Alpha 66. Then in July 1980, I returned to Havana — according to instructions I received — for further instructions.

SENATOR D'AMATO: Let me ask at this point, did there come a time that you became involved in the drug smuggling operation, bringing drugs into this country; and if there did come a time, will you indicate to us when that took place; and if under anyone's direction, whose direction?

MR. ESTEVEZ: Senator, also I want you to realize that back in '78, I was coming to the States, infiltrated to the States by boat. I came in the boatlift in 1980, but in '78, I was already in Miami.

SENATOR D'AMATO: You came as an agent.

MR. ESTEVEZ: Right.

SENATOR D'AMATO: Are you saying that you were recruited and specifically ordered to come over here?

MR. ESTEVEZ: Senator, the instructions after I returned back in July '80 and came back into the island, my instructions were to start making contacts in south Florida, specific in the area of Miami, of course, with illegal Haitians, Colombians and other Latin American countries in the area, who were dealing with drugs. My mission was to find outlets in the drug traffic. Then, in August 1980, I returned to the Bahamas or went to the Bahamas to make contact with a Cuban official by the name of Frank Bonilla.

On August 17, 1980, I met again with Frank Bonilla. At that time, in the evening, I was given a boat in which I was going to be the chief of operations and captain of this boat. From there, I sailed south to the Bahamas in order to meet with a person by the name of David Perez, which was the person that I was to contact for the people from Colombia in Miami. The shipment, my first shipment that I had on that boat, was worth about \$8 million of pills, Quaaludes, already manufactured.

After I was assigned to the boat, I got my instructions to pick up the shipment in Cuba. I headed south again back into Cuba. When we arrived in



Cuba, the person that I was to contact named David Pérez was having problem making arrangements with the trucks, which was going to be bringing the merchandise.

After receiving instructions and using the proper code, I did contact the Paredon Grande, which was the point of contact, to meet the boat or the ship named Coral from Colombia. The instructions came with the name of Viviani, the name of the boat. After seeing the ship, on sight, we discovered that the name was kind of a peel-off; and under that name was the name of Viviani, instead of Coral. We made the right connection at that time with David Perez, and the boat was the boat from Colombia which was giving us the shipment of the \$8 million of Quaaludes to bring to the States.

At three o'clock in the morning, we boarded another boat from the Institute of Cuban Tourism of the Republic of Cuba in which we met the different officials. One of them was a person of the name of Rene Daeza-Rodrigues. At that time, we received the proper instructions to be supplying the pills to Miami, and the code was, "We are going to have a good pharmacy, and as long as you can supply the pharmacy we'll have a good business." The different officials at that time decided everything was okay as far as they were concerned, and the pills were loaded on to the boat.

After all was okayed the boat that I was given by the name of Desilere, developed an engine problem. At that time, I received orders to use the Colombian boat to come into Miami. After trying to come into Miami, we developed problems in order to get access to Miami and make the drop. At that time I received orders — and it was my decision also — to return back and get rid of the cargo. And I dumped the cargo.

After receiving my new orders, I returned to Cuba specifically to the area of Paredon Grande, which was mentioned before. From there, I received orders to take a shipment of 23,000 pounds of marijuana and proceed to Bimini meaning an island in the Bahamas and wait for further orders.

By the way, the ship I mentioned here was a fishing ship of the Cuban government.

SENATOR D'AMATO: How many other agents were you aware of?

Mr. ESTEVEZ: While I was training, there were specific orders that no one was to engage in any conversation as far as mission being trained. However, there were people being trained. As far as agents of the Cuban government right now, working in the United States with the drug trafficking, I have informed the drug enforcement agency of the United States of approximately 400 agents specifically in drugs. I also have provided to the United States Government the names of a lot of those agents. At the same time, as far as agents going back and forth to Cuba and bringing drugs in to this country, very specifically one or two at a time. For example, last week, an agent friend of mine got ordered to return to Cuba; and at this time he is in Cuba receiving new orders for a new shipment into the States. That information has been passed onto the U.S. Government.

SENATOR D'AMATO: Did there come a time when you were finally able to successfully get drugs into this country and what, if anything, did you



do with the proceeds? How much did you derive? And what did you do with the funds?

MR. ESTEVEZ: On February 1, I received orders to go to Cayo Coco, which is the northern part of Varadero Beach close to Havana, Cuba. Here I met the Cuban official, I was transported to Havana. At that time, I arranged to receive 75 kilos of cocaine. I delivered the 75 kilos of cocaine to Miami. I received \$1,250,000 American money, and that money was returned to Cuba.

SENATOR D'AMATO: In other words, upon the consummation of the sale you received \$1,250,000. You then took that money and brought it back to Cuba. How long between the sale and your going back to Cuba with the money did you take?

MR. ESTEVEZ: The whole transaction took approximately 30 days, by the time I came to the shores of the United States, made delivery, the money handed down and returned back.

SENATOR D'AMATO: How much money did you, and over what period of time, raise by sale of drugs — cocaine, Quaaludes, marijuana — and how much did you turn back to the Cuban government?

MR. ESTEVEZ: From the period of '81 to '82, I feel that I was approximately responsible — for \$7 million from drugs returning to the Cuban government by trafficking back and forth.

SENATOR D'AMATO: You turned over \$7 million in money to the Cuban government?

MR. ESTEVEZ: Right. . . I was equipped with a special boat. I think we call them Cigarette Boats, speed boats. They usually have a V-8 automobile engine in them, and they are racing boats. The boats are made out of fiberglass. Some of them carry two engines. For example, my boat had two 427 cubic inch engines. They're made out of specific material in the bottom, where two pipes are formed at the time you make the boat; and each of these pipes has a cap at the end which is threaded with a cap and seal. That is where the cocaine is deposited at the bottom of the boat. The boat has a capacity of 285 gallons of fuel. It will take approximately — at the speed of 70 to 75 miles per hour, approximately two hours from Paredon Grande, which is the northern part of Varadero, to the Keys in the U.S. So basically — most of the time, that is the way I went back and forth to Cuba, using the speedboat. . . . I estimate that during the period '81-'82 I traveled two to three times a month back and forth to Cuba from the Miami area. The money was turned to a code name Lieutenant Colonel Carlos, who was a subordinate of the chief of ECOP, which is an agency, an internal agency such as HUD in the United States, Urban Development, and the name of the person who was in charge of this thing was Rene Rodriguez-Cruz, who was the chief of operations for this whole connection, if you want to call it that.

SENATOR D'AMATO: What was Mr. Cruz' official position?

MR. ESTEVEZ: He was probably equal to Minister of ECOP.

SENATOR D'AMATO: There was another part in addition to the smuggling operation. I understand that there were approximately 18 to 20 trips



that you took to Cuba from the United States for the sole purposes of smuggling in aliens. Is that correct? And if it's correct did you know what the purpose of those aliens — were they agents, criminals or other agents and what, if anything, did you know about their missions?

MR. ESTEVEZ: The individuals that I brought to this country, let's say, illegally, after the boatlift to Mariel in 1980 were friends, people who wanted to live in this country for whatever reason against the Cuban government. They were not Cuban agents. They did not come to this country for any specific purpose. The way the Cuban agents operated, each individual agent comes by himself. He receives instruction from one person. They don't know each other while they are performing their mission here.

MR. ESTEVEZ: I estimate 3,000 Cuban agents, specialists trained for different fields, came on the boatlift from Mariel with me. Not all of the agents were for drugs.

SENATOR MARINO: But for other purposes?

MR. ESTEVEZ: For other purposes. Individuals trained, paid, and loyal to the Cuban government came in the boatlift by approximately 3,000.

SENATOR BERNSTEIN: Who in the Cuban government set the price at which drugs were to be sold per kilo?

MR. ESTEVEZ: It doesn't matter what moves in Cuba or takes place in Cuba, nothing gets done in Cuba unless it has the blessings and the price set by Fidel Castro himself. . .

. . . For example, the kilo of cocaine was set to be sold \$38,000 minimum, \$40,000 maximum per kilo. Now, I would sell that one in Miami for \$47,000 a kilo. The \$7,000 difference between \$40,000 and \$47,000 my pocket money.

SENATOR D'AMATO: The only thing we can specify — because I think that begins to get speculative — is the fact, though, that this one agent in a period of a year accounted for \$7 million in cash that he personally turned over to the Interior Minister and/or his — or the Minister of Housing and/or his deputies in direct line of responsibility. In addition, when one considers the fact that he estimates that 300 to 400 agents — and I think he is very responsible in not attempting to inflate that number — 300 to 400 of the 3,000 agents were assigned to the task of smuggling in drugs and were similarly turning in their proceeds to the Cuban government, then we see a pervasive, systematic movement brought about by the Cuban government to destabilize, to raise funds, to create mayhem in our cities throughout this nation; and they have been quite successful in undertaking this. The fact of the matter is that here's not a person who's selling drugs for profit but that he had spent two years infiltrating groups, bringing about terrorists attacks, infiltrating Alpha 66. We're hearing from a person who's turned state's evidence to save himself who was an actual operative agent of the Cuban government.



Now, you have indicated before, this testimony has been corroborated by independent sources; that is not his own testimony. We find him an absolutely creditable witness, and someone who we owe a great deal of gratitude to. Now, I don't know how successful the other agents were; but given the fact that there were 400 agents and if they approached anywhere near his success, we are talking about \$2,800,000,000 that would have flowed to Cuba. That is an incredible thing. . .



# Cuban Government Involvement in International Drug Trafficking

# 7

During hearings\* by the Senate Drug Enforcement Caucus, The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism and The Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Senators Paula Hawkins, Jeremiah Denton, Jesse Helms and Dennis DeConcini questioned:

Stanley Marcus, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida  
Francis M. Mullen Jr., Acting Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration  
James Michel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs  
Mario Esteves Gonzalez, former member of the Cuban Intelligence Service  
Johnny Crump, former Colombian narcotics trafficker and  
David Perez, former narcotics trafficker

Their testimony revealed:

- The Cuban government, under Castro's personal direction is engaged in narcotics production and trafficking.
- Cuban narcotics profits are used to finance and promote terrorism, while undermining American society.
- Cuba is facilitating the illegal entry of Haitians into the United States.

Important excerpts of the testimony follow:

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\*Transcript from Hearings before the Senate Drug Enforcement Caucus, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism and the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, April 30, 1983, "The Cuban Government Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic".



**SENATOR HAWKINS:**

In 1980, as we all know, here in Florida, over 125,000 Cubans arrived in the United States via the Mariel boat lift. Unfortunately, many of the people that were mixed among the freedom-loving "marielitos," were thousands of hardened criminals. These felons were purposely dumped out of Cuban prisons and exported to the United States by Castro. The impact on Miami has been devastating. During 1981, Miami was labeled the "murder capital" of the United States. In 1981 alone, there were over 580 murders in this county. That was an increase of over 60 percent over the previous year. A startling 23 percent of these murders were committed with machine guns.

The goal of this joint hearing is to investigate and to establish the extent to which the Government of Cuba is promoting drug trafficking. The fact that Castro has chosen to associate himself with criminal elements and international drug smugglers, I believe, is a clear indication of his contempt for international law and his intent to undermine American society through drug addiction, moral corruption and violent crime. Investigations reveal that the Cuban dictator's support of drug trafficking is linked to his promotion of terrorism in Latin America. Ships are loaded with drugs in Cuba to be taken to the United States. They leave the United States. Many of these ships return to Cuba with weapons destined for the South American mainland. I believe the Cuban dictator's efforts to strike at Florida continue to this day. Only this month, we experienced another boat carrying 72 illegal Haitian immigrants found adrift in Florida waters and was towed to our shores. Now, although the illegal immigrants claimed that they had been at sea for weeks, neither they nor their boat exhibited signs of exposure. Close investigation of the boat revealed a medicine chest containing only Cuban and Bulgarian medicines. Clearly, Castro is providing a temporary harbor for Haitians and then facilitating their illegal entry into the United States by towing their boats into Florida or Bahamian waters.

**SENATOR HAWKINS** — What Cuban ports did you use and what routes did you take, would you show us or tell us?

**MR. PEREZ** — We would leave from Miami into Bimini, from Bimini we would come here, to Williams Key, right around this area. Then we would take this course over here (indicated) down here (indicated) to Guincho Key and to Paredon Grande somewhere in the area here (indicated).

Paredon Grande is a port in Cuba which is right about here, Ma'am (indicated).

**SENATOR HAWKINS** — What Cuban officials did you meet with while you were in Paredon Grande?

**MR. PEREZ** — Rene Cruz, Ma'am, and Aldo Santamaia Cuadrado.

**SENATOR DENTON** — According to your testimony, Jaime Guillot-Lara told you that he could get drugs into Cuba easily because, quote, he was paying money to the Cuban Government for their protection. . .

. . . The signal by which the LAZY LADY was cleared to enter into Paredon Grande was to lower the American flag and to fly a white flag along with the Cuban flag and you have mentioned that there was to properly signal the Cuban Government, and am I correct that the Cuban boats, the Cuban



boats 50 to 60 feet, in one case, and 30 to 40 feet in the other, with the larger boat having a gun aboard it, responded to that signal and then escorted you into Paredon Grande?

MR. PEREZ — Yes, sir.

SENATOR DENTON — Do you have any doubt, considering the scope, location and nature of these maritime illegal drug activities on the northern coast of Cuba, that they could have taken place without the knowledge of the highest level of the Cuban government?

MR. PEREZ. There is no doubt in my mind, sir, that the whole Cuban Government is very aware of what they are doing because during our conversation, one statement that Rene Cruz made to myself was, Fidel Castro himself was out in Central and South America doing all the kind of work related to what we were doing there, and that they were happy that we were bringing the drugs into the country and one specific statement that he made, and he was pretty serious about it, was that they could take Florida at any time that they felt.

SENATOR HAWKINS — The Cuban government could take Florida at any time?

MR. PEREZ — Yes, Ma'am. . .

. . . There was a discussion between Jaime Guillot and myself about the Cuban government was going to purchase 500 kilos of cocaine a month, so, very simply, just multiply 500 by 50,000. Each kilo of cocaine was worth, like \$50,000 here, in the United States wholesale price at that time, so that it is an awful lot of millions of dollars, Ma'am. They were to pay me two and a half million dollars for each time I carried that amount of load in.

MARIO ESTEVEZ — From an early age, I belonged to the Communist youth in Cuba and did my pre-university studies. I participated in various Communist programs in which I was selected because of my dedication to Cuban Communism and to the Revolution of Fidel Castro. Because of my efforts in the Communist Party, I was selected to work in the Ministry of the Interior, in the BEM Section, known as the official Bureau of the Ministry. My function in the BEM was to act as a spy on others working within the system. Because of my merits, I was made a sergeant. From sergeant, I was selected to act as a spy and to sabotage anti-Castro organizations in the U.S.A.

During the Mariel exodus, which was in 1980, I came to the United States and was able to infiltrate myself in Alpha 66, an anti-Castro organization. I was in Alpha 66 about two and a half months. My function was to sabotage equipment of the organization and in that period of time, I was able to sink two boats which costs thousands and thousands of dollars.

After I finished my mission, I was ordered to return to Cuba. For me and for many others, who have infiltrated, it is very easy to come and go to Cuba.

The first thing that I would do would be to send a telegram to my immediate supervisors. The telegram was in code. My supervisors were Lieute-



nant Colonel Carlos Nelson and Captain Efrain. They are members of the DGI assigned to the I-C-A-P whose head is Rene Rodriguez Cruz. After the telegram was sent, I would go by boat to Bimini and from there to Cayo Piedra, Piedra Key, Stone Key and then from Stone Key I would go to the Icacos Peninsula where Barradero Beach is in the Province of Matanzas. From Barradero I would go to Havana where my supervisors would interrogate me on my contacts, my actions and my knowledge acquired in Miami.

At that time, Lieutenant Colonel Nelson gave me instructions to make contact with drug traffickers in the United States and Bimini. My supervisors gave me \$5,000 for my expenses to infiltrate.

Based on my contacts with the drug traffickers, I began to traffic in drugs about August of 1980 until I was arrested on November 29th, 1981, for trafficking in marijuana.

SENATOR DeCONCINI — Does the Government operate the whole cultivation and protection of the product?

MR. ESTEVEZ — Yes, the DGI has that in its charge.

SENATOR DeCONCINI — Does the DGI have any other areas in Cuba, even though you have not seen them?

MR. ESTEVEZ — Yes. When I was working in the Ministry of the Interior in Villa Clara Province, I heard them talk about marijuana plantations in the Escambrai Mountain area.

SENATOR DeCONCINI — How long has the DGI been involved in this sort of activity?

MR. ESTEVEZ — I was working there in '75, '76 and '77. . .

. . . Fidel has been planning on this for a long time. The Soviet Union has been involved. This goes back to Viet Nam days.

SENATOR DeCONCINI — Does he have any estimate of the dollar value of the export of the marijuana?

MR. ESTEVEZ — About \$200,000,000.

The guerrillas pay in cocaine for their training. The Colombian guerrillas, the El Salvadoran guerrillas, and the cocaine that they seize from ships that they get, all of that comes up here to the United States.

MR. ESTEVEZ — In all of this, the Soviet Union is involved. Since Fidel Castro took over the chairmanship of the non-aligned countries, they have tried, through the Soviet Union, to undermine the United States in the eyes of the world, just like the Soviets did in Viet Nam where they undermined the prestige of the United States and another one of their operations there was the heroin for the U.S. forces.

After that, Fidel Castro took advantage of that Peruvian Embassy situation and the Mariel exodus situation. That had been planned for years. You

can be sure that that did not just happen. A lot of people seem to think that Fidel made a slip-up with that Peruvian Embassy situation. If Fidel Castro wanted, you would not have found four people inside that embassy.

This business of the narcotics traffic to the United States is a top secret one in Cuba. The only ones who know about it are the DGI agents and Fidel Castro, in particular.

I can tell you one thing, that no Cuban soldier would allow Fidel Castro to traffic in drugs because one thing I can tell you about our country is that Cubans hate drugs.

One of the reasons for this drug traffic with the United States is to throw the U.S. off in Central America and this big operation of drugs coming up to Miami is part of that. They are trying to create an atmosphere of crisis in the Southern United States and then throw you off and work up in the northern areas bringing equipment and medical equipment and supplies and other stuff through Panama and electronic equipment through Panama.

Lots of these arms that are sent to El Salvador and other places are American arms.

SENATOR DENTON — What they tried to do with infiltrating, emptying themselves of their most hardened criminals, introducing them into the United States is similar to the introduction of drugs into the United States?

MR. ESTEVEZ — Yes. No doubt about it. One of the first things that Fidel said in 1981 was, what do the corrupt imperialists think about this?

Here, in the U.S.A., you have different kinds of spies, propaganda spies, you have economic spies, terrorist spies and spies that are being trained for operations in Europe. Now, I am speaking of these as these are sort of special categories, not just those that are in the armed forces, but those that are in the Ministry of the Interior.

I think there has got to be something around 3,000 or over 3,000, and among those political prisoners, also there are spies. Then, you also have those common criminals and there were also lots of them who had been in Angola previously, and they were sent over here in groups of 20 and 40. Their mission would be that if there were ever any kind of trouble with Cuba or war with Cuba to create chaos here, in the United States.

If a radio station from the United States could get through to Cuba with that information, I don't think that the Castro government would last a year. That, I can tell you for sure.

I was told that if any type of radio transmitter station such as Radio Marti was set up here, that it would have to be urgently destroyed.

SENATOR DeCONCINI — What you are telling us, then, is that if the Cuban people, even the military people, many are members of the Communist Party, were to have knowledge that their government is in the massive drug production and exportation, that, indeed, in your opinion, there would be another revolution?



MR. ESTEVEZ — Certainly, there would be another revolution. Both the Cuban people and the military forces in Cuba, which are part of the Ministry of the Interior, just as in the case of me, personally, I used to have under my supervision members of the armed forces and members of the Party, too, everyone is being checked and watched. They would not be loyal if they knew what was happening, and I was not when I knew.

SENATOR HAWKINS — Do the Cuban people receive any radio broadcasts, to your knowledge, from the United States?

MR. ESTEVEZ — Yes, the American station that does get through to Cuba and it is not too powerfully, is the Voice of America, but Fidel Castro has a radio jamming installation which he installed in the Guanabo area so these stations don't get through.

When I was in Las Villas, everybody would get their news on the Voice of America. One friend would tell another, and that is the way we would know what was going on, and I can tell you — I don't want to be too long in making my statement here, but I can tell you that the Cuban Government and the Russians and the Communists are very much concerned about Radio Marti.

MR. MULLEN — As early as 1963, DEA predecessor agencies received information alleging a government of Cuba role in drug trafficking. Most of the reporting was uncorroborated and discussed isolated incidents. Not until the development of the Jaime Guillot-Lara investigation in late 1981, did we begin to collect corroborated, detailed intelligence indicating a Cuban role in drug trafficking.

Jaime Guillot-Lara, a Colombian national, is a major marijuana, cocaine and methaqualone trafficker whose activities have been known to DEA since at least 1976. He is the documented owner of or has an interest in many seagoing vessels capable of carrying tons of marijuana. A total of two point five million pounds of marijuana, twenty-five million methaqualone tablets and eighty pounds of cocaine were documented as having been sent to the United States by Guillot in 1977 to 1981.

Several sources of information provided intelligence and recently testified in court in Miami that certain officials of the Government of Cuba aided Guillot in the movement of drugs from Colombia through the Caribbean and into the United States.

Guillot began his association with Cuban officials in Colombia in late 1979 when another trafficker introduced him to Cuban officials assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Bogota. Although the possibility of utilizing Cuba as a stopover for drug cargoes was discussed, it was not until July of 1980, when Guillot again met with these Cubans, that serious consideration was given to the proposals.

During 1980, Guillot began to receive official Cuban protection for the movement of his drug-laden vessels to the United States. The Cubans reportedly charged Guillot \$10 per pound of marijuana transported through Cuba. Depending on the size of the shipment, Guillot was paying the Cubans



hundreds of thousands of dollars for each load of marijuana. The Cuban association with Guillot provided Cuba with a dual benefit.

DEA learned that Cuba's facilitation of Guillot's smuggling ventures provided hard currency which Cuba used to support revolutionary activities in Latin America. Cuba was also able to utilize the smuggling expertise and capabilities of Guillot by having him transport and deliver arms which were ultimately destined for the Colombian terrorist group, M-19, led by Guillot's close friend, Jaime Bateman.

On November 25, 1981, Guillot was arrested in Mexico City on false documentation charges. Although both the governments of Colombia and the United States attempted to extradite Guillot from Mexico, neither was successful. On September 30, 1982, Guillot was released and fled to Europe.

We believe that Guillot may have made his way back to Colombia. Now, other agencies may disagree, and he has been reported to be in Cuba and Spain and several other areas. Obviously, he is on the move at this time; we believe, possibly in Colombia.

When we examine the full amount of intelligence and evidence that is available from the 1970's, the Guillot investigation and its follow-up, as well as new intelligence being developed, it is the position of DEA that the Government of Cuba is cognizant of the movement of drugs through its territory and may be facilitating this movement. Considering the volume of drug trafficking in the Caribbean, the proximity of Cuba to the United States, and the benefits to be derived by Cuba from even minimal participation in the drug trade, it is important that we continue to be aware of this likelihood and that state, local and federal agencies will continue to share, analyze and pursue intelligence in the area.

MR. MICHAEL — We now have information that Guillot started his narcotics trafficking under official Cuban protection during the summer of 1980. His understanding with the Cuban authorities assured him safe passage through Cuban waters, in return for pay-offs at the Cuban Coast Guard station on the Cuban north coast across from Andros Island in the Bahamas. In addition to the provision of safe passage, Cuban officials maintained close coordination with Guillot. His contacts included the Ambassador of Cuba in Bogota, Colombia, Fernando Ravelo Renedo and the Minister-Counselor, Gonzalo Bassols Suarez. Both of these men were members of the American Department of Cuba's Communist Party Central Committee. He also dealt with American Department officials in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico.

He was urged by Bassols to work with M-19, the Colombian terrorist organization. In November 1981, Bassols reportedly made a loan to Guillot of \$10,000 with which to purchase 500 kilograms of cocaine on behalf of the M-19 and arrange its shipment to the United States.

We also know that Guillot, fearing arrest by the Mexican authorities, at one point considered taking refuge in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico to avoid arrest and was told by a Cuban contact there that, quote, Fidel, close quote, had instructed the Cuban Embassy to protect him.

At one point, another dimension of this, is that Guillot received a Nicaraguan visa from the Nicaraguan Ambassador to Mexico, who, ap-



parently, acted on a request from the M-19 leader. We know from separate sources that in early 1982 the Nicaraguan government was negotiating the sale of a DC-6 aircraft to a known Colombian drug runner. Whether or not this information indicates a Nicaraguan role is not clear from the information presently available, but it is disturbing, and we will be examining this closely, the Cuban/Nicaraguan relationship now being very well known.

We have a report that the Communist Party presidium, and, specifically, Fidel Castro, in early 1959 considered a scheme to begin dealings with narcotics smugglers using Cuba as a bridge and support base for networks to the United States as a means to aid Cuba economically and contribute to the deterioration of American society.

During an interview with Colombian journalists in October of 1982, Fidel Castro described Guillot as, quote, a good friend of Cuba, close quote. Castro's later statement to a Colombian news agency in January of this year that Cuba detains Americans involved in narcotics trafficking is true, but this is not necessarily inconsistent with a Cuban use of the drug weapon when it sees fit. We cannot expect the Cuban Government to acknowledge its involvement in drug trafficking in the United States, but the evidence clearly indicates more than a case of corruption by local or mid-level security officials.

The association of Guillot with the Cuban Embassies in Mexico and in Bogota and with officers of the American Department of the Cuban Communist Party gives strong indication of official policy approval. Thus, narcotics sanction, apparently, has been sanctioned by Cuba as a means to finance subversion in Latin America and the administration is determined to discover the extent of Cuban involvement in narcotics.

MR. LISKER — In your opinion, is the Cuban Government facilitating the importation of drugs into the United States?

MR. MICHAEL — I think the evidence is clear that the Government of Cuba has, as a matter of policy, used narcotics trafficking as an instrument for advancing its own interests in corrupting democracies within the hemisphere and advancing arms flow to revolutionary groups.



# 8

## THE CASTRO CONNECTION: BLUEPRINT FOR ACTION

On May 20, 1983, President Ronald Reagan said, “. . .there is strong evidence that Castro officials are involved in the drug trade, peddling drugs like criminals, profiting on the misery of the addicted. I would like to take this opportunity to call on the Castro regime for an accounting. Is this drug peddling simply the act of renegade officials, or is it officially sanctioned? The world deserves an answer.”

Four close aides to Fidel Castro, including two influential members of the Central Committee of Cuba's Communist Party, were indicted on charges of smuggling narcotics into the United States last winter. They were charged before a federal grand jury of acts specifically aimed at facilitating the importation of drugs into the United States and at circumventing the interdiction efforts of the United States.

James H. Michel, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs in the State Department, said on June 17, 1983: “We have a report that the Communist Party Presidium and specifically Fidel Castro, in early 1979, considered a scheme to begin dealing with narcotics smugglers using Cuba as a bridge and support base for the networks to the United States as a means to aid Cuba economically and to contribute to the deterioration of American society.”

Ambassador Thomas Boyatt, U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, testified before the U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on Foreign Affairs in April of 1982: “The Cuban connection with drug traffickers as a vehicle for harming the United States and shipping arms clandestinely to Colombia and elsewhere to help terrorists destabilize democratic governments must be exposed, understood, admitted and countered.”

In the face of the overwhelming evidence suggesting the involvement of the Cuban government in drug trafficking, a number of specific measures should be put into effect:

- 1) A first step should be to inform the Cuban government of the indictment of Cuban government officials by a federal grand jury and request the U.S. Justice Department officials be permitted to question (in Havana) those indicted.
- 2) A second step would be to present a formal complaint to the United Nations and the Organization of American States. Drug smuggling is an act that should be condemned by the world community as a whole.
- 3) A full U.S. report of the Cuban government's narcotics trade should be prepared and submitted to governments around the world.



4) Hearings should be held by the appropriate Congressional committees. Smuggling drugs into the United States as an official policy goes well beyond the standards of acceptable international behavior. The Congressional committees responsible for the drug traffic have begun to look into this problem. It remains, however for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to examine the implications on U.S. foreign policy of such unethical action by a neighboring government.

5) The extensive information already available on Castro's drug trade justifies the imposition of further sanctions on Havana by the international community. Particular attention should be given to the restriction of trade by Cuban government agencies, and the cutting off of credit to the Cuban government. These steps should be taken by the greatest possible number of countries, particularly those threatened by guerrilla movements inspired and aided by Havana.

6) Because Castro's government claims to punish drug-related crimes in Cuba and has ascribed the use of drugs in Cuba to North American influences, the exposure of its own involvement is particularly important. The proposed radio station for broadcasting to Cuba [Radio Marti] is essential for exposing the Castro regime's crimes and to make known the fact that the drug conspiracy is not an isolated misstep by venal officials, but part of a deliberate and longstanding policy of deception, of which the Cuban people themselves are the chief victims.

7) To lay the groundwork for these steps, a vigorous investigation of the Castro narcotics network is needed. This effort should include all U.S. agencies with responsibility for international affairs and drug enforcement: the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Department of State, and the Congress.


One goal of these investigations would be the extradition of Jaime Guillot-Lara, the fugitive drug smuggler, and the Cuban government officials with whom he worked. The resources of Interpol should be brought into play to assist in locating and arresting Guillot-Lara. Extradition of the government officials could be achieved if they were to travel to a third country with which the U.S. has an extradition treaty.

We must call on the Castro regime for an accounting of their part in the drug peddling which is affecting our nation.


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## Maps of Cuban Drug Trafficking Routes, Marijuana Fields and Intelligence Training Facilities











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